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Communication as constitutive of terrorist organizations
Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of organizing global terrorism. Based on the emerging perspective
to understand communication as constitutive of organization (CCO), we reconceptualize terrorist
organizations as essentially consisting of communicative events. At this, CCO allows for studying the
emergence, stabilization, and destabilization of terrorist organizing.
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COMMUNICATION AS CONSTITUTIVE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the question how today’s globalized forms of terrorism can be unders-
tood in their organizational dimension. Starting from the estimation that existing  concepts 
(e.g., hierarchy, network, or social movement) are limited in comprehending these new forms 
of terrorist organizing, we propose an alternative perspective on organizations as being more 
adequate: the communication-as-constitutive of organizations perspective (CCO; Ashcraft, 
Kuhn & Cooren, 2009; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). Based on the CCO perspective, terrorist 
organizations can be conceptualized as essentially consisting of communicative events which 
necessitate to become interconnected over time. Keeping in mind this rather ephemeral notion 
of organizations, CCO points our attention to the constitutive conditions which allow for the 
emergence and stabilization of terrorist organizing. We finally derive suggestions on how to 
destabilize the continuous reproduction of terrorist organizing practices.  
 
Keywords 
Terrorism; organization theory; organizational communication; communication-as-
constitutive of organizations (CCO) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent failed bombing attempt of a U.S. airliner by Nigerian terrorist Umar Farouk Ab-
dulmutallab has painfully reminded the world that the global phenomenon of terrorism is not 
banned and terrorists’ work practice are continuously evolving. The globalized terrorism of 
today’s time, especially in its version driven by islamistic-fundamentalist, i.e. jihadist ideolo-
gies, is characterized by an alarming effectiveness in both spreading fear and in attracting new 
followers (Greenberg, 2006). Terrorist organizing, however, takes place under extreme condi-
tions: Terrorist groups have to operate under permanent persecution and, therefore, require 
adapting to a clandestine form while coping with heavy restrictions to communication (Stohl 
& Stohl, 2008).  From an organization theory perspective, we still do not fully understand the 
phenomenon of terrorist organizing: How do terrorist groups, despite these opposing condi-
tions, nevertheless sustain their existence and manage to coordinate their actions on a global 
scale? 
In this paper, we aim to contribute to current debates on terrorist organizing (Sageman, 
2008; Kenney, 2007). We argue that existing concepts in the literature like hierarchies or net-
works are limited in taking the loose and fluid character of terrorist organizing into account. 
Instead, we propose to draw on the emerging theoretical perspective which defines communi-
cation as the constitutive element of organizations (abbreviated as CCO; Ashcraft, Kuhn & 
Cooren, 2009; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). The authors of this perspective put forth the idea 
that organizations essentially consist of interconnected events of communication. By drawing 
on this literature, we propose a new definition of terrorist organizations. Consequently, CCO 
enables us to describe terrorist acts as communicative events which gain their organizational 
character by referring to each other on the level of communication. The CCO perspective fur-
thermore points our attention to the importance of communication media (e.g., mass media or 
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the internet) for the global reproduction and continuation of terrorist organizing. At this, our 
paper enriches the classical debate on the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the 
media (e.g., Brosius & Weimann, 1991; Weimann & Winn, 1994) by the organizational di-
mension. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, we evaluate the heuristic value of existing 
concepts in the literature (i.e., hierarchy, network, social movement) and show their limita-
tions in comprehending today’s phenomenon of global terrorist organizing. Second, we intro-
duce the emerging CCO perspective as a potential candidate for enriching the debate on ter-
rorist organizing. Third, we apply the CCO perspective by re-describing terrorist organizing 
as a communication phenomenon. In this context, we emphasize the particular role mass me-
dia and the internet play for the reproduction of terrorist organizing practices. Finally, we 
conclude with an outlook to potential countermeasures against terrorism which can be derived 
from the CCO perspective. 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION OF TERRORISM:  
HIERARCHY, NETWORK, OR SOCIAL MOVEMENT? 
Generally, terrorism can broadly be defined as violent acts committed by a private (i.e., non-
governmental and non-military) individual or group in the aim to spread fear and, by means of 
this, to achieve certain political goals. In the following, whenever we use the term terrorism or 
terrorist organizing, we particularly refer to today’s global forms of terroristic practices. The 
most striking example of these new forms of terrorism on a global scale are such terrorist acts 
which draw on the legitimizing idea of jihad, i.e., the idea to promote a fundamentalist inter-
pretation of Islam by engaging in a fight against non-believers (Sageman, 2008). Therefore, 
most of our considerations may not apply to more local forms of terrorism (e.g., the IRA in 
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Northern Ireland or ETA in the Basque country). Keeping in mind Western governments’ 
limited capabilities to curtail terrorist organizing of the jihadist form, organization theory has 
equally struggled thus far in conceptualizing these new organizational forms of terrorism. 
Throughout the literature, there are mainly three concepts discussed for comprehending the 
organizational dimension of terrorism: hierarchy, network, and social movement. In the re-
mainder of this section, we will discuss each one of these concepts with regards to their heu-
ristic value in comprehending the organizational dimension of terrorism. 
In her analysis of the organizational dimension of terrorism Mayntz (2004) argues that 
terrorist organizations seem to combine features from both hierarchical and network types of 
organizations: On the one hand, they are characterized by clearly defined leadership, func-
tional integration, and vertical communication – all typical features for hierarchical organiza-
tions. On the other hand, they are characterized by a considerable degree of autonomy in 
planning, quick and flexible reactions to situational exigencies and relatively open and fluid 
boundaries – all typical network features. This particularly holds true for the terrorist organi-
zation labeled as al Qaeda: “In the literature, discussions of Al Qaida [sic] and the new ‘net-
works of terror’ tend to merge into each other. Descriptions of Al Qaida are characteristically 
vague with respect to the organization-or-network question” (Mayntz, 2004: 10). Therefore, 
given the “hybrid character of terrorist organizations” (Mayntz, 2004: 11), Mayntz raises the 
question if we indeed have to deal with a type sui generis, oscillating between hierarchical 
organization and network. 
Other authors, in contrast, reject any attempts to describe terrorism as hierarchical or-
ganizations or networks (e.g., Hoffman, 2004; Jackson, 2006; Corman & Schiefelbein, 2006; 
Sageman, 2008). They criticize accounts which try to grasp terrorism by help of the network 
concept (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2002; Krebs, 2002; Carley, 2006) for even being too rei-
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fied – given that jihadist terrorist groups appear to operate disconnectedly to a large extent 
(Corman & Schiefelbein, 2006). A classical notion of networks implies that all members of 
the network are connected somehow, at least indirectly or remotely.   
As the jihadist bombings from Madrid (in 2003) or London (in 2005) have shown, 
however, there has not even been an indirect or remote connection (Beck, 2008: 1574). The 
groups which had committed the attacks were instead operating autonomously: “There isn't 
the slightest bit of evidence of any relationship [of the Madrid bombers] with al-Qaeda. We've 
been looking at it closely for years and we've been briefed by everybody under the sun […] 
and nothing connects them." (Scott Atran; cited by Hamilos & Tran, 2007). Corman and 
Schiefelbein, therefore, conclude: “Today [al Qaeda] is more of an ideal or social movement 
that is replicated by relatively disconnected groups (as in the case of the Madrid and London 
bombers) than a network of cells controlled by a ‘mother ship’” (Corman & Schiefelbein, 
2006: 4).  
The suggestion to grasp global jihadist terrorism as a social movement has found sig-
nificant resonance in the recent literature (e.g. Snow & Byrd, 2007; Beck, 2008). Based on 
Benford and Snow’s notion of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000), Beck stresses that 
“rather than having a formal organizational structure, transnational movements […] are linked 
by collective passion for an issue” (Beck, 2008: 1673). This conception of terrorism is also in 
line with Sageman’s notion of the “leaderless jihad” (Sageman, 2008) in which he describes 
the global jihadist movement as a disconnected network of largely self-organized groups. 
Hoffman goes even further when he states that al Qaeda today “has become more an idea or a 
concept than an organization; an amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely 
coupled transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organiza-
tion” (Hoffman, 2004: 551f.). 
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However, from an organization theory perspective, the social movement lens on ter-
rorism remains unsatisfying. Although the authors’ arguments are convincing that the social 
movement concept may better reflect the loose and disconnected character of global jihadist 
terrorism, it fails to acknowledge that at least we have to deal here with instances of organiz-
ing. Even authors who themselves apply a social movement lens to terrorism emphasize the 
need for an organizational perspective on terrorism: “[T]o understand suicide bombing, as 
well as other aspects of the course and character of Islamic terrorist movements, one has to 
investigate, among other things, the processes of frame articulation and elaboration as organi-
zationally embedded activities” (Snow & Byrd, 2007: 13; own emphasis added).  
Taken together, the existing concepts in the literature can be evaluated as being limited 
in comprehending the organizational dimension of terrorism. Concepts of hierarchy fail to 
take the flexible and fluid character of terrorist organizing into account. Network concepts, in 
contrast, are better suitable to account for the dynamic character of terrorist organizing. How-
ever, the network term still implies that there is an actual network of individuals who are at 
least remotely or indirectly connected. For some terrorist acts of the past years, this evidently 
was not the case (as shown by the examples of the Madrid and London bombings). Moreover, 
both terms hierarchy and network assume a fixed membership base so that an individual is 
either a member of the organization or not. Current terrorism organizing practices instead 
seem to draw on a rather latent membership base. This is where the social movement concept 
may well fit in: With this concept, terrorist organizing can be described as both flexible and 
fluid and as characterized by a latent membership base. However, the terrorist movement 
seems to lack some of the most common characteristics of social movements, the mobilization 
of the masses. Moreover, the social movement concept is suitable to account for large social 
collectives but lacks details regarding the organizational aspects of terrorism.  
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 summarizes the main implications of the three concepts hierarchy, network, 
and social movement when used for comprehending terrorist organizing. Given the deficits in 
their heuristic value, we suggest an alternative theory perspective which centers around the 
communicative construction of organizations and which allows us to comprehend the loose 
character of terrorist organizing without fully rejecting the idea that we have to deal here with 
some form of organization, even if it is an extreme type.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMMUNICATION  
AS CONSTITUTIVE OF ORGANIZATIONS (CCO) 
In order to understand today’s global terrorism as an organizational phenomenon, we propose 
to go beyond the network concept and instead draw on a cross-disciplinary theoretical pers-
pective at the intersection of communication studies and organization theory which defines 
communication as the constitutive element of organizations (for recent overviews, see Ash-
craft, Kuhn, and Cooren, 2009, or Putnam and Nicotera, 2009). According to this perspective, 
organizations are constituted by acts of communication while, conversely, acts of communi-
cation tend to promote the emergence of organizational structures (Taylor & van Every, 
2000). As Castor points out, “organizational communication scholars […] are becoming in-
creasingly interested in the communication as constitutive of organizations (CCO) perspective 
that views organizations as socially constructed through communication” (Castor, 2005: 480). 
The CCO approach attempts a radical shift in perspective: it rejects the notion that organiza-
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tions are constituted by their members (e.g., Lee & Lawrence, 1985: 52). Instead, it adopts a 
somewhat counter-intuitive and abstract notion of organizations as being constituted by 
ephemeral acts of communication: “An organization is not a physical structure – a collection 
of people (or computers), joined by material channels of communication, but a construction 
made out of conversation“ (Taylor, 1993: 22).  
The CCO perspective roots in the field of organizational communication, a sub-field 
of communication studies. Scholarly descriptions of organizational communication as a field 
commonly draw on three root metaphors of the communication-organization relationship: 
containment, production, or equivalency (Putnam, Phillips, & Chapman, 1996). The contain-
ment metaphor locates communication as occurring within the boundaries of an organization, 
which effectively acts as a container (Putnam, Phillips, & Chapman, 1996, 375). In turn, the 
production metaphor suggests that the organization produces communication in the course of 
action. The isomorphism metaphor, finally, is most radical in nature as it sets organization and 
communication on a par: organization is communication (Taylor, 1995). Among the various 
strands of the CCO perspective as outlined by Ashcraft, Kuhn, and Cooren (2009), it is the 
work of the Montréal School of organizational communication (e.g., Taylor &   van Every, 
2000; Cooren, Taylor & van Every, 2006) which leans most towards the isomorphic assump-
tion of the organization-communication equivalency. Accordingly, Taylor defines organiza-
tions as nothing less and nothing more than “an interlocking network of communication 
processes” (Taylor, 2003: 12).  
In this paper, we will additionally draw on a second tradition of isomorphic CCO theo-
rizing (not present in the article by Ashcraft, Kuhn, and Cooren, 2009): As Blaschke, 
Schoeneborn and Seidl (2009) point out in a recent paper, the Montréal School’s approach to 
organizations shows major similarities to the theory of social systems, as developed by Niklas 
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Luhmann (1995; 2000) and followers (Bakken & Hernes, 2003; Seidl & Becker, 2006). Just 
like the Montréal School, Luhmann (2000) defines organizations essentially as consisting of 
communications. Organizations then are able to stabilize themselves over time by a conti-
nuous production and reproduction of communicative acts.  
Generally, we can summarize two main shared assumptions of the CCO perspective 
across the various schools: 
First, CCO undertakes a radical shift in perspective by defining communication as the 
basic element of organizations. This turns our common understanding of organizations inside 
out: According to CCO, the organization consists of communicative events, rather than of 
organizational members. In line with this view, it appears to be appropriate to transcend the 
reified notion of organization as a stable entity and to use the more procedural term of orga-
nizing instead (cf. Weick, 1979), which highlights the organization’s necessity to become 
established and re-established again over time by means of communication.  
Second, the CCO perspective underlines the ephemeral and processual character of or-
ganizations by defining them as fluid at their core, that is, as an ongoing production of com-
municative events. This poses the question of how organizations are able to link one event to 
the next and in this manner to scale up from local interaction to organization (Cooren & Fair-
hurst, 2009). Their perpetuation is seen here as something improbable and critical. Therefore, 
CCO focuses on the constitutive conditions which enable the organization to stabilize itself 
over time despite the ephemeral character of communications (McPhee & Zaug, 2000). 
In sum, the CCO perspective offers an alternative view to organizations, a processual 
perspective which reveals the communicational side of organizing. In particular, this view 
gives scope for an enhanced understanding where conventional notions of organizations fail – 
for example, in understanding loose forms of organizing such as virtual organizations. Fur-
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thermore, the perspective allows for grasping organizations which do not have a fixed body of 
members. According to CCO, whenever an individual gets involved in a particular type of 
organizational communication or is acting with reference to an organization, he or she contri-
butes to the social-communicative construction of this organization as a collective actor (Coo-
ren, 2006). In consequence, according to this view, no clear-cut distinction between an inside 
and an outside of the organization can be made. Moreover, the CCO perspective places media 
and genres of communication right at the center of the organization and reveals how changes 
in the information and communication media affect the organization as a whole. Framed like 
this, the CCO appears to be particularly suitable in taking account for the loose, fluid and 
event disconnected character of terrorist organizing.   
 
APPLYING CCO TO TERRORIST ORGANIZING:  
EMERGENCE, STABILIZATION, AND DESTABILIZATION 
The Emergence of Terrorist Organizing out of Communication 
The CCO perspective can now be readily applied to the phenomenon of terrorism. In the lite-
rature on terrorism, there is a long reaching tradition to define terrorist attacks as acts of 
communication (e.g., Dowling, 1986; Stohl, 1988; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Japp, 2003). As 
Stohl emphasizes, terrorism needs to be seen “as a process of political communication not 
simply a destructive or ‘simple’ act of violence” (Stohl, 1988: 4). Dowling confirms: “Too 
small or weak to obtain a military victory, terrorists are forced to use violence rhetorically” 
(Dowling, 1986: 13). With the term “performance violence”, Juergensmeyer (2000) suggests 
to grasp terrorist events as performative speech acts (cf. Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). Perfor-
mative speech acts differ from constative speech acts in that the action a sentence describes is 
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performed by the sentence itself. In consequence, similar to promises or insults, acts of terror-
ist violence create the state of affairs they relate to by being communicated. 
If acts of terrorism are defined as representing communicative events, the question 
arises how these ephemeral acts of communication are turned into something more stable, an 
organizational structure which both ensures and facilitates future communicative acts? From 
the idea that organizations consist of processes of communication it can be derived that the 
organization's existence will depend on its ability to connect and re-connect communicative 
events (what it exists of) over time. Organizations most typically ensure this by increasing the 
likelihood that individuals commit to a particular discourse by means of a fixed membership 
(by distinguishing between an inside and outside of the organization; Luhmann, 2000: 390). 
Luhmann (1981) generally emphasizes the improbability of the perpetuation of com-
munication. However, among all organizations, the continuous existence of terrorist organiza-
tions appears to be particularly unlikely given that they have to operate under extreme cir-
cumstances and heavy restrictions to communication (Stohl & Stohl, 2008). Seen from the 
CCO perspective, the terrorist act itself, especially if it adapts to the form of suicidal attacks, 
can be defined as an act of “ultimate communication” (Japp, 2003: 72). It destroys the in-
volved persons in the very moment of being executed. Or, even in its non-suicidal form, the 
likelihood that the same person can commit follow-up terrorist acts is at least significantly 
diminished by measurements of persecution or imprisonment. In other words, terrorist com-
munication requires “a steady influx of participants who are willing to die for a cause” (Beck, 
2008: 1568). 
Nevertheless, terrorist organizations obviously are able to overcome these extreme 
challenges by attracting new followers who commit to these (ultimate) acts. Apparently, they 
rely on a different form of membership than conventional organizations do: They are able to 
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draw on a latent pool of potential organizational members which do not become actual orga-
nizational members until they commit to a communicative act of terrorism. The terrorist act 
itself, being an instance of communication, may then serve as a role model for future acts of a 
similar kind. This “contagious character” of terrorist violence (Holden, 1986) draws on the 
fact that violence is understood trans-culturally in its immediacy and physicality by “the pow-
er of example” (McCormick, 2003: 479; cf. Tarde, 1912). 
Taken together, given that organizations need to attract typically the same human 
agents contributing to the continuation of communicative processes, the global jihadist terror-
ism needs to be considered as a particularly improbable organization. How is it then possible 
that the terrorist act as a communicative phenomenon and terrorist organizations as commu-
nicative entities are able to transcend their fundamental inherent improbability? This points us 
to taking a closer look on the constitutive and stabilizing factors which enable terrorist organ-
izations to nevertheless persist over time. We will elaborate on this question in a next step of 
the analysis.  
 
The Stabilization of Terrorist Organizing Over Time 
The CCO perspective puts into question how organizations, if defined as consisting of some-
thing as ephemeral as communication, are able to stabilize themselves over time. With re-
gards to this question, authors in the tradition of the Montréal School emphasize the impor-
tance of non-human agency for the emergence of organization out of communication, i.e., the 
capability of non-living objects of all kinds, e.g., texts or other artifacts, to act and to make a 
difference (Cooren, 2004; 2006; cf. Orlikowski, 2007). Texts are seen here as “a conceptual 
scaffolding made up of words, phrases, turns of speech, metaphors, anecdotes, all of which 
are there because of the distillation, stored in language in the memory of participants, of their 
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personal and collective history of previous interactions” (Taylor, 1999: 26). With this defini-
tion, the authors of the Montréal School refer to the “staying capacity” of texts (réstance; 
Derrida, 1988) or their “distanciation” (Ricoeur, 1981), the capability to transcend space and 
time. While circumstantial factors may vary, texts remain impressively robust over time by 
becoming detached from their authors’ intentions and the context of their creation. Accor-
dingly, if organizations are defined as ephemeral communicative entities, texts come to play a 
crucial role for their stabilization. 
Transferred to the special case of terrorist organizations, the emphasis on texts as a 
constitutive element of organizations reminds us of the extensive literature which deals with 
mass media reports as a precondition for sustaining the existence of terrorism. Dowling 
(1986) points out that mass media reports on terrorism play a double constitutive function for 
terrorist organizations as they both address “outsiders” (the wider public they aim to terrify) 
and “insiders” (sympathizers they want to seduce by a rebellious role model). The effects on 
“outsiders” are well explored in the notion of a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and 
the media (e.g., Brosius & Weimann, 1991; Weimann & Winn, 1994; Corman, Trethewey & 
Goodall, 2007). Without the coverage by mass media, it is argued here, terrorists would lack 
the platform to achieve their main targets: “Terrorism without its horrified witnesses would be 
as pointless as a play without an audience” (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 139). Or, as DeLillo puts 
it, terrorism is “the language of being noticed” (DeLillo, 1991: 157).  
However, the effects on “insiders” are largely under-examined, particularly in their 
organizational dimension (cf. Mayntz, 2004). We aim to fill in this void by proposing that 
media reports on terrorist acts may affect sympathizers in a twofold way and, with this, help 
to stabilize terrorism organizationally. We basically distinguish here between the stabilization 
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of the organization as a communicative entity and the stabilization of the communicative 
practices which constitute the organization:  
(1) Stabilization of the terrorist organization as communicative entity: Media reports 
contribute to the construction of terrorist organizations as a collective actor. In the coverage 
of recent terrorist attacks, the media tend to ascribe every attack committed by jihadist activ-
ists to al Qaeda as the one and only and all encompassing terrorist organization (Snow & 
Byrd, 2007: 119). Consistently throughout the scholarly literature (e.g., Hoffman, 2004; Stohl 
& Stohl, 2007), in contrast, the global jihadist movement is described as involving a broad 
and heterogeneous variety of terrorist groups the recurrent instead of a monolithic body al 
Qaeda. Independent from a direct correspondence with social reality, the media’s recurrent 
and coherent references to the al Qaeda label facilitates the social construction of its organiza-
tional identity. This, in turn, appears to result in self-reinforcing dynamics so that it becomes 
easier for follow-up attacks to explicitly refer to al Qaeda as a collective actor (cf. Stohl & 
Stohl, 2008) and, with this, to re-stabilize its existence repetitively. 
This argumentation can be further explicated by help of an example provided by Tay-
lor and Cooren:  
When Columbus proclaimed Cuba to be Spanish territory ('In the name of the King of Spain'), it 
was Columbus who was the actor but the actant was Spain, and Columbus was acting as an agent 
for a principal, the Crown […]. This is how the many voices of a collectivity become, institution-
ally, the one voice of an organization […]. As soon as one acts for another, an organizational link 
is on its way to be created. And when the ‘other’ is a collective […] other, an organization is the-
reby constituted as an entity. Such entities have, however, no existence other than in discourse, 
when their reality is created and sustained. (Taylor & Cooren, 1997: 428f.; emphasis in original) 
Thus, for Taylor and Cooren (1997) the constitutive moment of an organization occurs 
as soon as an abstract actant gains the concrete status of an actor; in their example, when 
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Spain or the Crown is acknowledged as a collective entity and the human agent acts on behalf 
of it. The organization’s inception, however, happens to take place exclusively on the level of 
communication and has no existence beyond communication. This social-constructivist pers-
pective on organizations may also help to comprehend the particular character of jihadist ter-
rorism in its organizational dimension. By means of media reports, al Qaeda is continuously 
stabilized as a collective and accountable actor which facilitates that human agents can act on 
behalf of it and maintain its discursive reality. In the terms of Giddens (1984), every follow-
up act depends on the given structure but contributes to the structure’s reproduction by being 
executed, at the same time. Of course, we need to mention that it can be in the interest not 
only the media but also of other parties (e.g., governmental actors) to construct al Qaeda as 
one addressable actor and to mask the variety and complexity behind it (cf. Jackson, 2006: 
253) which may additionally explain the especially wide dissemination of the al Qaeda label. 
(2) Stabilization of the communicative practices which constitute the organization: We 
assume that media reports contribute to the institutionalization of the terrorist act as a genre of 
communication, an established and recurrent communicative practice. This assertion links 
back to the concept of framing which has its origins in the social psychology of Goffman 
(1959): "Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organiza-
tion, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy" (Nelson, Oxley & Claw-
son, 1997: 221). When news media report on terrorism, they inevitably also provide a frame 
of reference by embedding the terrorist act in a particular context (e.g., George W. Bush’s or 
FOX News’ framing of the “war on terror”). The recurrent character of frames facilitates the 
identifiability of a particular type of terrorist acts (e.g., aircraft hijacking or kidnapping) and 
its reproducibility by means of “contagion” (cf. Weimann & Winn, 1991; Pape, 2003). Ter-
rorist acts then provide a role model for how a terrorist act can be realized organizationally by 
illuminating the horizon of potential terrorist organizing practices and giving it a concrete 
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form. This feature of media reports of terrorism furthermore raises the question to what extent 
even fictional depictions of  terrorism (such as in the TV series “24”) may trigger similar 
effects by imagining (not-yet-realized) terrorist acts and ultimately by giving them a repro-
ducible format. CCO enables us to describe terrorist acts as communicative events which gain 
their organizational character by referring to each other on the level of communication (i.e., 
citing each other) but without requiring the persons conducting these acts to be members of 
the same formal organization. Thus, the social-communicative construction of al Qaeda as 
collective actor may have effects independent from its correspondence with social reality, 
e.g., that its mere existence and publicity promotes imitative terrorist acts which again re-
stabilize the collective actor (Stohl & Stohl, 2008). 
Furthermore, mass media reports on terrorism can foster the organizational learning 
capabilities of terrorist groups by providing a rich source of information relevant to them. 
Thus, depending on the detail level of disclosure, the media coverage can serve as a know-
ledge management backbone for the global terrorism movement. This estimation particularly 
holds true for professional investigative journalism. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks, jour-
nalists aim for reconstructing the underlying processes which have led to these terrible events. 
In the course of this, their reports also reveal strategies, “best practices”, or the decision 
processes underlying the execution of terrorist acts as well as governmental and military reac-
tions to them. These effects of course are presumed to be additionally promoted by computer-
mediated communication like the internet (for a recent overview, see Weimann, 2008), espe-
cially by the advent of private publishing forms such as Weblogs or online videos shared via 
YouTube. Furthermore, media coverage is of course only one of several potential information 
resources for terrorist groups or sympathizers, next to personal contacts or training camps. 
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The potential knowledge management backbone function of mass media reports in the 
aftermath of terrorist acts for the organizational reproduction of terrorism may become clearer 
if we compare it to efforts of knowledge management in business firms (for an overview, see 
Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2005). It would be very costly for business firms to employ large 
numbers of professionals who are in charge of reconstructing and reflecting on the decision 
processes of a past project, what mistakes were made, and exploring the reasons why it was 
successful or failed (Schoeneborn, 2008). In the case of terrorism, exactly this seems to be the 
case: For terrorists and their sympathizers, professional journalism fulfills an external service 
provider function by revealing all the details of a past “project” and making them accessible 
to other remote groups. Lucky for them: The media’s services are provided almost free of 
charge as their provision is driven by media-inherent interests to distribute their publications 
to the biggest audience possible. Consequently, the media may facilitate terrorist organiza-
tions’ abilities to learn from mistakes (cf. Edmondson, 1996) as well as to employ adaptive 
strategies (cf. Tyre & von Hippel, 1997).   
 
Destabilization by Reparadoxification 
The results of the theoretical analysis raise the question how to curtail the facilitative function 
of mass media reports for the organizational reproduction of terrorism (cf. Cohen-Almagor, 
2005). As Dowling points out, “some suggest that the news media should agree that no cover-
age will be given to terrorist spectaculars. After all, these advocates reason, if the media gave 
birth to these terrorists, they can be eliminated by reverting their actions” (Dowling, 1986: 
22). This corresponds with Laqueur’s assertion that “the real danger facing the terrorist is that 
of being ignored” (Laqueur, 1978: 62). Juergensmeyer adds that “without being noticed, in 
fact, terrorism would not exist” (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 139). The underlying assumption of 
these appeals is that acts of violence may have “contagious“ effects – as expressed by the as-
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sertion: “News of sensational violent crimes often prompts similar incidents” (Brosius & 
Weimann, 1991: 63).  
The idea to prevent a repetition of violent acts by restricted media coverage has found 
application in fields beyond terrorism, for instance, in practices of suicide prevention. In the 
“Viennese Experience” (Etzersdorfer & Sonneck, 1998), local news media in Vienna agreed 
not to report whenever an individual committed suicide in the public transport system. In ef-
fect, the model led to a significant decrease of suicide rates by minimizing their media-driven 
contagiousness. Similar measurements have also been applied with regards to terrorism. In 
Russia, for instance, in the aftermath of the terrorist acts in Beslan in 2004, “numerous bills 
have been debated in the Duma on the issue of limiting the activities of and the reporting by 
the mass media […]” (Simons & Strovsky, 2006: 190). According to most observers, howev-
er, the censorship measurements applied by the Russian government caused more harm than 
benefit by significantly undermining trust and credibility of the Russian media system (Ha-
raszti, 2004). 
The Beslan example highlights the important alarm function mass media fulfill in 
modern societies (Frey, 2006: 3). Thus, a ban of media coverage on terrorism would funda-
mentally undermine this function. Dowling (1986) furthermore argues that there are two main 
reasons which prohibit stopping any media coverage on terrorism: First, a stop would inevita-
bly lead to an “escalation of horrors”. Terrorists would feel challenged to increase violence so 
that their acts cannot be ignored by the media: “Perhaps the biggest problem with such a vo-
luntary ban is that it very quickly would become a battle of wills between the determined ter-
rorists and the reluctant complying media” (Dowling, 1986: 22). Second, even if there is no 
media coverage on terrorist events there would be non-mediated, alternative ways to spread 
information and rumors about these events, particularly in the today’s age of the Web 2.0, 
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featuring real-time messaging services such as Twitter (cf. Weimann, 2008). In effect, panic 
among the public may even increase (Bassiouni, 1982: 22).  
Given this dilemma situation, we suggest to approach the question of how to curtail 
the contagious effects of news media reports on terrorism by drawing on the theoretical 
framework guiding this study, the CCO perspective. In his theory of social systems, Luhmann 
(1992; 1995) conceptualizes communication as the basic element of all social systems. Thus, 
when it comes to organizations, Luhmann identifies a more specific type of communication 
which is unique in its potential to let organizational structures emerge: the communication of 
decisions (Luhmann, 2000). According to this view, the first and foremost function of organi-
zations is to assure the continuous re-production of decisions out of decisions. Decisions, in 
turn, are understood as communicative acts which process distinctions between theoretically 
indefinite, but practically constrained alternatives.  
Generally, the necessity to interconnect decisions to each other is based on a paradox: 
the paradox of the undecidability of decisions (cf. von Foerster, 1992; Derrida, 2002). Luh-
mann’s understanding of this paradox is best described by von Foerster’s assertion: “Only 
questions that are in principle undecidable, we can decide” (von Foerster: 1992: 14). In other 
words, questions which have only one answer, i.e., questions which can only be decided in 
one way, cannot enforce the communication of decisions and, consequently, let organizations 
emerge: “[…] if a decision can be reached through absolute deduction, calculation, or argu-
mentation [it does] lead to a final closure or fixation of contingency without simultaneously 
potentializing alternatives. […]. So-called rational decisions are not decisions at all” (Ander-
sen, 2003: 246). Thus, what we have come to call decisions in everyday language does not 
necessarily correspond with the notion of the term in social systems theory. Here, the defining 
aspects of decisions are their inherent undecidability and contingency.  
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Luhmann’s social systems perspective then enables us to observe system-inherent 
strategies of organizations to deparadoxify themselves (cf. Czarniawska, 2001; 2006). As An-
dersen points out: In relation to decision communication it is essential for organizations to 
make decisions look decidable: “Decision communication is able to deparadoxify itself by 
basically making freedom look like restraint. In a certain sense, organizational communication 
through the form of decision consists of nothing but continual attempts to deparadoxify deci-
sions. The way they do is an empirical question” (Andersen, 2003: 249; emphasis in original). 
As Nassehi puts it: “If there were any secure knowledge on how to decide, there would not be 
a choice. To have the choice means not to know what to do. This is the main problem of or-
ganizations as social systems, consisting of the communication of decisions to perform strate-
gies to make this problem invisible” (Nassehi, 2005: 186; emphasis in original). 
This conception can now be transferred to the issue of an intertwined relationship be-
tween terrorism and the media. Terrorist acts, being characterized by the usage of massive 
violence, can be interpreted as measures to deparadoxify the inherent undecidability of deci-
sions. The deparadoxification of decisions, however, is itself paradoxical by nature: “Every 
decision communicates that there are alternatives to the decision – otherwise it would not be a 
decision – and it simultaneously communicates that since the decision has been made, there 
are no alternatives – otherwise, again, it would not be a decision” (Seidl, 2006: 146; emphasis 
in original). The same holds true for terrorist acts: On the one hand, in their opposition to ex-
isting states of the world, they represent an explicit selection from other alternatives in form 
of a negation. On the other hand, in their radicalness, they communicate that there has not 
been any alternative, they represent a clear-cut and destructive decision. In this context, mass 
media reports which promote a visibility of terroristic decision processes allow for connectivi-
ty of decision communication over space and time. Particularly, reports in the aftermath of 
terroristic events which highlight the organizational dimension of terrorism, what alternatives 
23/35 
where considered, and what decisions have been made by terrorists to accomplish their tar-
gets, can then represent a constitutive condition for other groups to connect to these events 
with follow-up decisions on similar terroristic activities.  
Following the aim to curtail terrorism, our study implies to engage instead in a reparadox-
ification of news media reports on terrorism. Applying the strategy of reparadoxification 
would mean to re-introduce ambiguities to mass media reports on terrorism. This can be rea-
lized, for instance, by illuminating terrorism’s inherent contingencies and contradictions, e.g., 
by referring to single groups or small organizations rather than to label them as all belonging 
to an overarching franchise organization named al Qaeda: “It must be made known that several 
terrorist groups could be responsible for a particular terrorist act” (Frey, 2006: 3; cf. Frey, 2004: 
127f.) in order to avoid the media’s tendency “to greatly oversimplify matters of terrorism” 
(Wieviorka, 1993: 48). With this, strategies of reparadoxification can help in complicating 
individuals’ commitment to the al Qaeda movement. Thus, within the range of recommenda-
tions on how to curtail terrorism (cf. Clegg, 2008), our study suggests that the media can 
complicate terrorism’s reproduction by avoiding too clear-cut and under-complex coverage on 
terrorist events and instead commit to a reparadoxification of news media reports on terrorist 
acts.  
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
This study has dealt with the question how today’s globalized forms of terrorism can be un-
derstood in their organizational dimension. Starting from the estimation that that existing  
concepts (e.g., hierarchy, network, or social movement) are limited in comprehending terrorist 
organizing, we have argued that an alternative perspective on organizations can prove to be 
more adequate: the communication-as-constitutive of organizations perspective (CCO; Ash-
craft, Kuhn & Cooren, 2009; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). The CCO perspective conceptualizes 
organizations as consisting of interconnected events of communication. Accordingly, terrorist 
organizations can be described as consisting of loosely interconnected acts of “ultimate com-
munication” (Japp, 2003), i.e., terrorist acts. Keeping in mind this rather ephemeral notion of 
organizations, the CCO perspective points our attention to the particular constitutive condi-
tions which allow for the emergence and stabilization of organizations out of communication.  
As we argued above, the jihadist terrorism movement’s apparent ability to globally co-
ordinate actions gives reason to investigate mass media reports on terrorism (e.g., by newspa-
pers, TV, and also on the internet) as one constitutive condition for the organizational repro-
duction of terrorism. As argued above, media reports facilitate the connectivity of terrorist 
communication in a twofold way: (1) Media reports on terrorism contribute to the communic-
ative construction of the terrorist organization (e.g., al Qaeda) as a collective actor, (2) they 
frame recurrent genres of terrorist acts which facilitates their repetition and variation, and they 
serve as a resource of rich and detailed information on the organizational preconditions of a 
terrorist act, i.e., the processes of preparation and execution. The media are therefore stuck in 
an insoluble dilemma: They have to report on terrorist acts in order to fulfill their alarm func-
tion for democratic societies, on the one hand, but potentially facilitate follow-up acts of a 
similar kind. With the idea of reparadoxification (cf. Czarniawska, 2001), one strategy has 
been presented which can be applied to diminish mass media reports’ facilitative function for 
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the organizational dimension of terrorism. The new aspects yielded by the applying CCO to 
terrorist organizing are summarized by table which compares them to the previous concepts 
of hierarchy, network, and social movement.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Finally, we also need to mention significant limitations of this study: First, the analys-
es presented in this paper are limited to the global jihadist terrorism of recent years and do not 
apply to more local forms of terrorism (e.g., the IRA in Northern Ireland or ETA in the Bas-
que country). Second, the study concentrates on only one of several potential constitutive 
conditions for the organizational reproduction of terrorism, i.e., mass-media reports on terror-
ist acts, but ignores other important aspects such as religious belief systems or certain patterns 
of socialization (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Pape, 2003; Gambetta, 2006). Third, the study has 
remained entirely on a conceptual level. Therefore, we would like to point out some potential 
paths for a further empirical investigation of terrorist organizing based on the CCO perspec-
tive: Of course, the empirical investigation of issues of terrorism is generally restricted due to 
the clandestine nature of terrorism and characterized varying degrees of accessibility as a field 
or research (Brannan, Esler & Strindberg, 2001). In the aim to nevertheless develop a propos-
al how to empirically substantiate our study, we need to distinguish here between the two 
main dimensions involved: The media coverage on terrorism on the one hand, and the effects 
these may cause on “insiders” (Dowling, 1986) for the reproduction of terrorist acts, on the 
other hand. On the level of media coverage, a combination of quantitative and qualitative tex-
tual analysis would allow for tracing the organizational cues contained in mass media reports 
on terrorism and their development over time (cf. Holden, 1986; Crelinsten, 1989). On the 
26/35 
level of effects on sympathizers, a meta-analysis of existing field studies on terrorism (e.g., 
Jackson et al., 2007a; 2007b) would allow for evaluating the general importance of mass me-
dia reports in terms of organizational learning for terrorist organizing. 
Taken together, our conceptual study contributes to existing debates on the organiza-
tional dimension of terrorism (e.g., Mayntz, 2004; Corman & Schiefelbein, 2006; Jackson, 
2006; Snow & Byrd, 2007; Sageman, 2008) by adding CCO as a new perspective to the de-
bate. The CCO perspective is advantageous in that it allows for transcending the hierarchy-or-
network debate by emphasizing the loose and ephemeral character of terrorist organizations. 
This conception of terrorist organizations comes closer to a notion of jihadist terrorism as a 
social movement (cf. Snow & Byrd, 2007; Beck, 2008) but without neglecting the organiza-
tional aspects of terrorism. At the same time, the study directly relates to the emergent debates 
on the CCO perspective (Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren, 2009; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009) by 
showing how the application of this theoretical perspective can make a difference in our un-
derstanding of organizations operating at the extreme. In this respect, it can be fruitful to ap-
ply the perspective also to similar forms of organizations which share with terrorism aspects 
like self-recruiting and rather loose coordination, e.g., the anti-globalization movement or the 
processes underlying the collaborative creation of the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. Last 
but not least, the study shares an aspiration expressed by Stohl and Stohl: “Undoubtedly, un-
derstanding the emergence, maintenance, and dissolution of terrorist networks will also pro-
vide insights into less destructive and more constructive types of organizing” (Stohl & Stohl, 
2007: 119). 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of Existing Concepts (Hierarchy, Network, Social Movement)  
Regarding Their Comprehension of Terrorist Organizing 
 
 Hierarchy Network Social Movement 
Ontology Organization as stable 
entity 
Organization as dynam-
ic entity 
Organization as process, 
held together by shared 
frame or issue 
Leadership Centralized Centralized or  
decentralized 
Decentralized 
(i.e., leaderless) 
Membership 
base 
Fixed, clear distinction 
between inclusion and 
exclusion 
Fixed, but with  
permeable boundaries 
Latent membership base 
Communication Top-down, along  
hierarchical lines 
Flat communication, 
along network edges 
Bottom-up, emerging 
Counter-
measures 
Eliminate the top Eliminate central net-
work nodes 
Diminish power of 
framing 
Evaluation: Con-
ceptual Short-
comings 
Fails to take flexibility 
and fluidity of terrorist 
organizing into account 
Inappropriate for some 
terrorist acts (Madrid; 
London) by assuming at 
least remote or indirect 
connection between 
network members  
Terrorism lacks mobili-
zation of masses; li-
mited focus on orga-ni-
zational dimension 
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of CCO with Existing Concepts (Hierarchy, Network, 
Social Movement) Regarding Their Comprehension of Terrorist Organizing 
 
 Hierarchy Network Social Move-ment 
Organization as
Communication 
Ontology Organization as 
stable entity 
Organization as 
dynamic entity 
Organization as 
process, held 
together by 
shared frame or 
issue 
Organization as 
process, held 
together by re-
producible com-
municative prac-
tices 
 Leadership Centralized Centralized or  
decentralized 
Decentralized 
(i.e., leaderless) 
Decentralized 
(i.e., leaderless) 
Membership 
Base 
Fixed, clear dis-
tinction  
between inclusion 
and exclusion 
Fixed, but with  
permeable boun-
daries 
Latent member-
ship  
base 
Latent; member-
ship constituted 
by executing 
particular com-
municative acts 
Communication Top-down, along 
hierarchical lines 
Flat, along net-
work edges 
Bottom-up, 
emerging 
Flat, emerging, 
self-reproducing 
Counter-
measures 
Eliminate the top Eliminate central 
network nodes 
Diminish power 
of framing 
Diminish repro-
ductive potential 
(e.g., by repara-
doxification) 
Evaluation: 
Conceptual 
Shortcomings 
Fails to take flex-
ibility and fluidi-
ty of ter- 
rorist organizing 
into account 
Inappropriate for 
some terrorist 
acts (Madrid; 
London) by as-
suming at least 
remote or indirect 
connection be-
tween network 
members  
Terrorism lacks 
mobilization of 
masses; limited 
focus on organi-
zational dimen-
sion 
Unclear defini-
tion of what spe-
cifies communi-
cation as being 
organizational 
  
 
 
 
 
 
